

Avoiding referential ambiguity

How do children learn to avoid referential ambiguity? Insights from eye-tracking.

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Children have considerable difficulty producing informative and unambiguous referring expressions, a fact that still lacks a full explanation. Potential insight can come from psycholinguistic models of ambiguity avoidance in adults, which suggest that, before describing any scene, speakers pro-actively monitor for some -- but not all -- types of potential ambiguity, and then subsequently monitor whether their just-produced expression provides an ambiguous description. Our experiments used eye tracking to assess the developing roles of these skills in children's referential communication. Experiment 1 shows that adults' eye movements can index the processes of both pro-active and self-monitoring. Experiments 2 and 3 show that children (n = 110) typically do not pro-actively monitor for potential ambiguity, although they do show evidence of pro-active monitoring on the occasions when they produce informative expressions. However, we do find evidence that children consistently monitor their own descriptions for ambiguity, even though they rarely correct their utterances. We propose that the process of self-monitoring might act as a learning signal, that guides children as they acquire the ability to monitor pro-actively.

Keywords: Referential communication, language production, development, eye tracking, ambiguity

Note that data and analysis scripts can be found at:

<https://github.com/hughrabagliati/ETRef>

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Children learning a language are not only required to master its structural features, such as phonology and syntax, but must also learn to communicate their messages in effective ways. In particular, children must learn to produce utterances that are appropriately informative and unambiguous. If Wee Jim owns both a red hat and a blue hat and wants to wear the red one, then it is uninformative for him to demand "I want my hat" (not to mention a little domineering). A more informative request would, instead, specify which of the two hats he desires. It is well established that learning to generate these appropriately informative utterances is a difficult task for young children: Preschoolers, and even young school-age children, who take part in referential communication tasks (an experimental analogue of the situation described above) frequently produce descriptions that are decidedly ambiguous and uninformative (e.g., Glucksberg & Krauss, 1967; Glucksberg, Krauss, & Weisberg, 1966; Matthews, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2007; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Sonnenschein & Whitehurst, 1984, amongst others). But while children's difficulty with reference is well-established, exactly why this difficulty exists -- and why it persists so late in development -- remains something of a mystery.

The most historically prominent explanation for children's difficulties with referential communication has focused on egocentricity: Children are assumed to be somewhat blind to the mental states of other people, and so they fail to take these states into account when communicating (Glucksberg et al., 1966; Krauss & Glucksberg, 1969; Piaget, 1926). But this idea has fallen out of favour, as study after study has demonstrated that children who are too young to successfully complete a referential communication task, are nevertheless surprisingly adept at reasoning about the mental states of others,

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including in communicative situations (Glucksberg, Krauss, & Higgins, 1975; Liebel et al, 2009; Liebel, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2010; Moll et al, 2008; Nayer and Graham, 2006; O'Neill, 1996; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Consistent with this, recent work has shown that children with ASD, who have difficulty taking the perspective of others, still show age-appropriate success in completing referential communication tasks (Fukumura, 2015; see also Nadig, Vivanti, & Ozonoff, 2009).

An alternative approach has been to ask whether children's more general cognitive limitations, such as their still-developing working memory or executive function capacities, might play a role in their referential communication abilities (de Cat, 2015; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Varghese & Nilsen, 2013). Under these theories, children and adults are assumed to have similar ego-centric biases, but are strikingly different in their ability to over-ride that egocentrism and act in a communicatively appropriate fashion. For example, Nilsen (e.g., Nilsen & Graham, 2009) has suggested that adults can override these biases because they have stronger executive functions (see also Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Epley et al., 2004). Consistent with this, she has found an increased use of egocentric biases in children who have relatively weak executive function skills (Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Nilsen, Buist, Gillis, & Fugelsang, 2013; Nilsen, Varghese, Xu, & Fecica, 2015), independent of their age or linguistic ability. But while it seems plausible that skills like inhibition, monitoring, or working memory may play important roles in facilitating children's referential communication, exactly what those roles might be is unclear.

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Perhaps the major limiting factor for developing a cognitive theory of children's referential communication is that our current understanding of the moment-by-moment mechanisms involved in children's language production is too sparse to offer much guidance. While we know an increasing amount about how children comprehend language online (Fernald, Pinto, Swingley, Weinberg & Roberts, 1998; Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Rabagliati, Pylkkänen & Marcus, 2013; Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004; and see Snedeker & Huang, 2015 for review), we know much less about how they plan and structure their own utterances (although for recent examples of investigations using eye tracking, see Bunker, Trueswell, & Papafragou, 2012; Davies & Kreysa, 2016; Norbury, 2014). Previous work on children's referential communication has suggested some production strategies that children might use to decide what to say (Glucksberg et al., 1975; Sonnenschein & Whitehurst, 1984; Whitehurst & Sonnenschein, 1981), but has not tied these strategies in to a specific processing model of children's language production.

The adult psycholinguistics literature can provide some suggestions about what that processing model might look like. Recent work has suggested particular situations in which adults -- like children -- consistently generate expressions that are ambiguous and uninformative. An examination of the differences between the situations in which adults tend to be informative and the situations in which they do not, can therefore shed light on precisely which skills children must master in order to communicate in an adult-like way.

In particular, Ferreira and his colleagues (Ferreira, 2008; Ferreira, Slevc, & Rogers, 2005) have shown that adults frequently produce uninformative referring expressions when describing scenes that contain "linguistic" ambiguities. This difficulty was found in a

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simple referential communication task, in which participants had to name a target picture from an array that also contained a foil picture and two distractor pictures. In the critical manipulation, the target picture and the foil picture shared a lexically ambiguous label. For instance, if the target was a baseball bat then the foil would be an animal bat. Adults were strikingly bad at noticing and avoiding ambiguity in this task: they frequently labeled the baseball bat as *bat* even though this also described its foil (Ferreira et al., 2005; Rabagliati & Snedeker, 2013), a behavior that is strikingly similar to children's performance in more standard referential communication tasks.

By contrast, adults have little difficulty avoiding what Ferreira et al term "non-linguistic" ambiguities. The same adults who do not notice the ambiguity caused by a baseball and an animal bat will naturally notice and account for the ambiguity caused by two different baseball bats. That is to say, adults do not notice ambiguity caused by overlap in linguistic representation alone (i.e., two different concepts with one label) but they do notice ambiguity caused by overlap in both non-linguistic and linguistic representations (i.e., two different instances of the same thing).

The findings discussed so far suggest that, when speaking, adults monitor for non-linguistic ambiguity both proactively and automatically (i.e., without regard to the needs of their partner), while failing to proactively monitor for linguistic ambiguity. But this cannot be the entire story as, oftentimes, we do notice that the expression we have just produced is ambiguous. This suggests that monitoring not only occurs while we prepare an utterance, but also afterwards: speakers can re-comprehend their utterances and check for ambiguity or speech errors (cf. Levelt, 1983). This monitoring can also help speakers

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to avoid ambiguity in their subsequent productions: Ferreira and colleagues (2005) found that when asked to name a baseball bat followed by an animal bat (or vice versa), speakers may say *bat* for the first picture, but often correct themselves and produce an unambiguous expression (*baseball bat*) for the second picture.

Ferreira's findings with adults suggest a more precise description of how referential skills develop, one in which children do not just move from being generally underinformative to being informative *tout court*, but in which they gradually learn a very particular set of skills for avoiding certain types of ambiguity. One of these skills is an automatic tendency to monitor for potential non-linguistic ambiguity before speaking. Another is a set of processes that can be deployed to evaluate whether their own just-produced speech is appropriately informative¹. Note that both proactive monitoring and self-monitoring could potentially be influenced by the executive function skills that have been argued to influence children's effective referential communication.

To what degree do children's difficulties with effective communication derive from difficulties with the two tasks of proactively monitoring for non-linguistic ambiguity and re-interpreting their own utterances? Here, we measure both of these skills in young children, and assess how they relate to children's referential communication ability. Understanding the development of language production processes is an important aim

¹ Ferreira et al describe this as a production-based strategy. They initially suggest that it might occur before producing a word (i.e., the speaker monitors what they are about to say) but their experimental data indicate that it in fact operates more efficaciously once a label has been articulated. We call this self-monitoring, following Levelt (1983).

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in-and-of itself, and should also provide a firm foundation for understanding how abilities like executive functions could affect referential communication. For example, developmental improvement in executive function may facilitate children's monitoring. Alternately, it may be the case that even young children have little difficulty monitoring for ambiguity, but fail to produce informative descriptions due to failures to properly inhibit pre-potent names for objects (e.g., saying *hat* rather than *red hat* because that is the more typical label). In our experiments, children and adults engaged in simple referential communication tasks while we tracked their pattern of gaze. The use of eye tracking allowed us to go beyond previous work, by generating a precise measure of which ambiguity monitoring mechanisms do, and do not, operate when children engage in referential communication tasks.

Since previous work on adults' linguistic and non-linguistic ambiguity avoidance has not used eye tracking, we first demonstrated that both proactive monitoring and self-monitoring can indeed be measured with an eye tracker. To do this, in Experiment 1 we analyzed adults' eye movements as they completed referential communication tasks that involved either non-linguistic ambiguities (which should reveal use of both proactive monitoring and self-monitoring of what was said) or linguistic ambiguities (which should only reveal self-monitoring). Because adults often fail to inform about linguistic ambiguities, we reasoned that their eye movements for this particular condition should provide an analogue to children's eye movements in a standard referential communication task. Our critical eye tracking measure was participants' saccades between a to-be-described target picture and a foil picture. The target-foil pair could cause

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the scene to be either non-linguistically ambiguous (e.g., two different dogs), linguistically ambiguous (a baseball bat and animal bat) or entirely unambiguous. Based on previous work (Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2006) we reasoned that participants would saccade from the target to the foil when they noticed the ambiguity, whether that was before or after speaking.

Our subsequent experiments, which only involved non-linguistic ambiguities, assessed whether proactive monitoring and self-monitoring are operative in young children. In particular, we looked at how these skills -- assessed using measures derived from Experiment 1 -- related to each child's tendency to produce either informative or uninformative utterances.

Experiment 1.

Methods

Participants

24 English-speaking undergraduates from the University of Edinburgh who were paid for participation.

Materials

On each trial, participants saw a display of three pictures, a target, a foil, and a distractor (Figure 1). For ambiguous trials, target-foil pairs consisted of sets of pictures depicting either two different objects drawn from the same category (non-linguistic ambiguity, e.g., two different cars) or two things drawn from different categories but sharing a name (linguistic ambiguity, e.g., a baseball bat and an animal bat). For unambiguous trials, the

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foil was replaced with a new picture that shared neither category nor label with the target. There were 16 pairs of trial-foil pairs altogether, and target and foil pictures were counterbalanced between subjects (i.e., the same car was a target for half the subjects, and foil for remainder). Triads were displayed on a 1280 by 1024 resolution monitor screen, and all pictures were constrained to be 280 pixels long on their longest dimension (either width or height, the other dimension could vary below 280).

Adults completed 16 test trials (8 ambiguous scenes, 8 unambiguous scenes) along with 24 filler trials, that were also ambiguous and used a different set of pictures. Fillers were included in order to reduce the possibility of participants explicitly noticing the aims of this task, allowing us to measure whether participants spontaneously monitored for ambiguity. Ambiguity type was varied between subjects, so that half of the adults saw non-linguistic ambiguities, and half saw linguistic ambiguities. Scene type (ambiguous/unambiguous) was varied within subjects, using a Latin square design.

Procedure

The task was conducted using an EyeLink 1000 Eyetracker in remote mode, attached to an LCD monitor. We sampled from the right eye at 500Hz. Subjects first completed a six point calibration routine, using a picture of Elmo's face as a target.

Each trial (see Figure 1) began with a Preview phase, in which three pictures were displayed for 4250ms. Then, Elmo appeared next to one picture, and a pre-recorded instruction asked participants "Which picture does Elmo like?" After participants answered, the experimenter pushed a button to end the trial: Elmo disappeared, but the

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pictures remained onscreen for 750ms. A full-screen picture of Elmo then appeared, and participants heard a recording of him producing positive feedback (e.g., “wow!” or “yay!”).




Figure 1. Outline of a sample trial.

Analyses

We analyzed participants' descriptions and their gaze behavior over the trial. We first coded whether participants provided referentially specific descriptions of the targets. We used a liberal coding scheme, coding any description as specific if it could not have been applied to the target's foil. For instance, *small dog*, *dog on the left*, *Chihuahua* or *dog... that is small* counted as specific, but *dog* or *hound* did not. We analyzed responses using a mixed effects logistic regression; expressed using lmer syntax this had the form $\text{Label} \sim 1 + \text{Scene Type} * \text{Ambiguity Type} + (1 + \text{Scene Type} | \text{Subject}) + (1 | \text{Item})$

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Our eye movement analysis focused on saccades around the scene over three phases of the trial. First, a Preview phase, as in Figure 1. Second, a Pre-Naming phase which lasted from the offset of the preview (i.e., the point at which Elmo appeared) to the onset of the participant's response (coded offline from the recording of their answers). Finally, a Post-Naming phase, that lasted until the end of the trial.

We defined regions of interest centered around each of the three pictures, of size 350 by 350 pixels; we call these the target picture ROI, the foil picture ROI and the distractor picture ROI. Our dependent variable was the proportion of “critical” saccades, defined as saccades that began in the target picture ROI and ended in the foil picture ROI, or vice versa, as a proportion of all saccades that began in one of the three ROIs and ended in a different ROI. Since the regions of interest were small, we counted fixations landing close to the ROI as being within the ROI, assessed using the automatic procedures in EyeLink's DataViewer software. We analyzed this proportion of critical saccades using a mixed effects regression model, of the form $\text{Proportion of Critical Saccades} \sim 1 + \text{Scene Type} * \text{Ambiguity Type} + (1 + \text{Scene Type} | \text{Subject}) + (1 | \text{Item})$. We report standardized Beta values as effect sizes throughout the manuscript. Where standardization was not coherent (e.g., for logistic models), we report β values, these indicate how the log odds of the outcome were affected by a one unit change in a predictor (non-categorical predictors were always standardized, such that a one unit change indicates a one standard deviation change). For linear mixed models, we calculated p values by using a normal approximation to the t distribution.

Results

Verbal Descriptions

Participants were more likely to produce referentially specific descriptions of ambiguous scenes than unambiguous scenes, but this effect was much smaller when the ambiguity was linguistic ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}}=0.48$ ($\text{SD}=0.23$), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}}=0.3(0.23)$) than when the ambiguity was non-linguistic ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}}=0.84(0.17)$, $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}}=0.15(0.1)$). Our mixed effects model analysis confirmed that there was a significant effect of scene type ($\beta = 1.2(\text{SE} = 0.15)$, $z = 7.9$, $p < .001$) and no effect of ambiguity type ($\beta = 0.25(0.21)$, $z = 1.2$, $p = 0.23$), but these were qualified by a reliable interaction between scene type and ambiguity type ($\beta = -0.75(0.14)$, $z = 5.2$, $p < .001$): Participants were reliably more likely to avoid non-linguistic ambiguity than linguistic ambiguity.

Eye Movements

Figure 2 shows the proportion of critical saccades (i.e., between target and foil) across the three phases of the trial for the linguistic ambiguity condition and the non-linguistic ambiguity condition.

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


Figure 2. Mean proportion of critical saccades (i.e., saccades between target and foil pictures, over all saccades between pictures) across time windows in the Linguistic Ambiguity condition (top) and Non-linguistic Ambiguity condition (bottom). Bars indicate +/- 1 standard error.

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Preview Phase

Adults' eye movements during the Preview phase suggested that they were proactively monitoring for non-linguistic ambiguity, much more so than for linguistic ambiguity. Even before Elmo identified which picture was the target, we found reliably more saccades between target and foil when a scene's ambiguity was non-linguistic ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.53$ (0.08), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.33$ (0.08)) than when it was linguistic ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.41$ (0.08), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.35$ (0.08)). This was confirmed by a reliable interaction between scene type and ambiguity type ($\text{Beta} = 0.14$ (0.049), $t = 2.9$, $p = 0.0037$). This interaction qualified a reliable effect of condition ($\text{Beta} = -0.26$ (0.049), $t = 5.3$, $p < .001$), indicating more critical saccades for ambiguous scenes, and a marginal effect of ambiguity type ($\text{Beta} = -0.12$ (0.052), $t = 1.9$, $p = 0.06$).

We followed up this interaction by separately testing for effects of scene type in the non-linguistic and linguistic ambiguity trials, confirming that there was a robust effect for non-linguistic ambiguities ($\text{Beta} = -0.4$ (0.067), $t = 6$, $p < .001$) and a much smaller, non-reliable effect for linguistic ambiguities ($\text{Beta} = -0.12$ (0.077), $t = 1.5$, $p = 0.13$).

Pre-Naming Phase

We expected that, for ambiguous scenes, participants would also produce more critical saccades during the pre-naming phase, particularly for non-linguistic ambiguities. However, while our data trended in that direction, the expected effects were not reliable. We found a slightly higher proportion of critical saccades on ambiguous scenes for both non-linguistic ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.68$ (0.19), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.61$ (0.27)) and linguistic

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ambiguities ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.52 (0.19)$, $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.4 (0.19)$). There was no overall effect of scene type ($\text{Beta} = -0.12(0.063)$, $t = 1.8$, $p = 0.072$), and no scene type by ambiguity type interaction ($\text{Beta} = 0.018(0.063)$, $t = 0.29$, $p = 0.77$), although there was a reliable effect of ambiguity type, indicating more critical saccades for non-linguistic rather than linguistic ambiguity trials ($\text{Beta} = -0.15(0.063)$, $t = 2.4$, $p = 0.016$). We attribute the two null effects to participants' pro-active monitoring in the preview period, as well as participants' short naming latencies (responses started, on average, after 1047ms [sd=505ms]), which minimized our power to detect an effect.

Post-Naming Phase

Finally, we looked to see if participants self-monitored for ambiguity in what they had said aloud. Our initial analysis did not provide strong evidence either way. The effect of scene type on critical saccades was numerically greater in the non-linguistic ambiguity condition ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.72 (0.22)$, $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.54 (0.25)$) than the linguistic ambiguity condition ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.54 (0.27)$, $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.5 (0.29)$), but this interaction was not significant ($\text{Beta} = 0.086(0.086)$, $t = 1$, $p = 0.32$), and nor were the effects of scene type ($\text{Beta} = -0.13(0.086)$, $t = 1.5$, $p = 0.13$) and ambiguity type ($\text{Beta} = -0.1(0.072)$, $t = 1.4$, $p = 0.16$).

Surprised by this null result, we looked closer at the data to see if a focus on the proportion of saccades may be masking a subtler effect. Instead, we analyzed the proportion of trials that contained a critical saccade between target and foil picture. Trials were coded as 1 if they contained a critical saccade, and 0 otherwise, and these data were analyzed using a mixed effects logistic regression. The results were consistent with self-monitoring.

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Participants made critical saccades on more trials when the scene was ambiguous, and this did not appear to depend on whether the ambiguity was non-linguistic ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.52 (0.23)$, $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.28 (0.2)$) or linguistic ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.37 (0.14)$, $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.24 (0.13)$). This was reflected in a reliable effect of scene type ($\beta = -0.42(0.12)$, $z = 3.6$, $p < .001$). The effect of ambiguity type was only marginal ($\beta = -0.2(0.12)$, $z = 1.7$, $p = 0.085$) and the interaction was not reliable ($\beta = 0.098(0.12)$, $z = 0.85$, $p = 0.4$).

Discussion

Experiment 1's results provide new evidence to confirm why speakers are more likely to avoid non-linguistic ambiguity than linguistic ambiguity. Participants' eye movements indicated that they pro-actively monitor for non-linguistic ambiguity before they begin speaking, but that they do not notice or monitor for linguistic ambiguity. In particular, before speaking, participants tended to make more saccades between target and foil pictures on non-linguistically ambiguous trials, but did not do so on linguistically ambiguous trials.

Participants' eye movements also provided some indication that they were monitoring how their spoken responses mapped on to the world around them, regardless of the type of ambiguity. That said, robust evidence for this effect was only found in a supplementary analysis, in which we analyzed the proportion of trials that contained a critical saccade, rather than analyzing the overall proportion of critical saccades.²

² Although we cannot be certain why the result depended upon the analysis, we suggest that failure to find an effect on the "overall proportions" analysis may be the result of

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However, the main result here – direct evidence that participants explicitly monitor for potential non-linguistic ambiguity before they begin speaking – is open to an alternative interpretation. In particular, it is possible that participants deduced the structure of the task and realized that, when a non-linguistic ambiguity was present, one of those two pictures was more likely to be mentioned. That is to say, the eye movement evidence for pro-active monitoring might instead reflect guesses about which picture would be chosen as the target. We conducted a follow-up experiment to assess this possibility, using the same non-linguistic ambiguity stimuli as in Experiment 1. However, rather than ask participants to verbally describe the target picture, we instead asked them to simply point at it. If participants' eye movements in the Preview phase of Experiment 1 were driven by pro-active monitoring, then we would not expect to find the same gaze patterns here, since points are unambiguous and do not need elaboration. But if the gaze patterns in Experiment 1 were due to task strategies, we would still expect participants to saccade between target and foil in Experiment 1a.

Experiment 1a

Methods

Participants

12 English-speaking undergraduates from the University of Edinburgh who were paid for participation.

participants failing to make any saccades at all on unambiguous trials, resulting in missing data for those trials.

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Materials and Procedure

We used the exact same materials and procedure as in the non-linguistic ambiguity condition of Experiment 1, except that we removed the spoken instruction to name Elmo, and instead told participants to point at the picture indicated by Elmo, once he appeared.

Analyses and Results

We assumed that our participants could point at a picture, and so did not record or analyze their movements. Instead, we simply analyzed the proportion of critical saccades in the Preview phase, using a mixed effects regression model as before.

If participants' eye movements during the Preview phase of Experiment 1 were due to their discovery of the task's structure, then we would expect to see the same pattern in the preview phase of Experiment 1a. In fact, we found no evidence that participants were inspecting the scene for potential ambiguity. They made a similar proportion of critical saccades during ambiguous scenes as during unambiguous scenes ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.39$ (0.2), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.33$ (0.06), (Beta = -0.047(0.076), $t = 0.62$, $p = 0.54$).

Furthermore, the effect of scene type on participants' saccades in Experiment 1a was significantly smaller than the effect found in the non-linguistic ambiguity condition of Experiment 1 (which used the same set of pictures, Beta = 0.2(0.056), $t = 3.6$, $p < .001$). As such, these data indicate that the pattern of eye movements observed during Experiment 1's preview phase was due to participants' proactive monitoring for potential non-linguistic ambiguity.

Discussion

Our analyses of eye movements in Experiments 1 and 1a provide direct evidence that, when speaking, adults proactively monitor for non-linguistic ambiguity, but not linguistic ambiguity. In addition, we found more limited evidence that adults' eye movements reflect their monitoring of what they actually say, allowing them to detect both non-linguistic and linguistic ambiguity.

Experiment 2

Since Experiment 1 successfully showed how eye movement measures can reveal monitoring processes before and after production, Experiment 2 assessed whether children show evidence of the same processes as they complete a referential communication task. As the Introduction discussed, children often fail to provide informative descriptions of ambiguous scenes, even when the ambiguity is non-linguistic; we therefore did not assess linguistic ambiguities in this study, as we assumed that children would invariably fail to provide informative descriptions of these scenes. Instead, we moved to a different experimental design, testing only non-linguistic ambiguities, and attempting to measure whether and how children's monitoring differed on trials where they produced informative descriptions, compared to trials where they produced uninformative descriptions.

In particular, testing only non-linguistic ambiguities, we compared children's eye movements between three types of trial: unambiguous scenes, ambiguous scenes in which children produced uninformative responses, and ambiguous scenes in which children produced informative responses. In this way, we could test exactly which

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monitoring processes operate, and which do not, when children succeed or fail at informative referential communication.

Methods

Participants

69 3- to 5-year-old children from the Edinburgh area (33 female, from 36 to 69 months, mean age 54 months [SD 8 months]) participated. We did not record detailed demographic information, but participants were typically White and from middle-class families. 11 further children were excluded due to a microphone malfunction (meaning that we could not code their responses) or failing to complete the task.

Materials

We used the same 16 test trials (8 ambiguous scenes, 8 unambiguous) from the non-linguistic ambiguity condition of Experiment 1. We did not use unambiguous filler trials, because we were anxious not to prime children to produce single-word responses. Children also received an additional warm-up session beforehand. They were shown three pictures on a piece of paper, and told that Elmo would appear next to his favorite, which they should name. The experimenter then put a counter depicting Elmo next to one picture, and encouraged the child to name it out loud. Children were given 4 warm up trials; half the trials contained ambiguous scenes, and Elmo always indicated one of the paired objects. The first time that children produced an uninformative description of an ambiguous scene, the experimenter provided feedback, pointing out the ambiguity, and encouraging the child to produce an informative description. This was the only corrective feedback that children received during the study. Once the experimenter was satisfied

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that the child understood the task and was providing easily understood responses, the main experimental session began.

Procedure

We used the same EyeLink 1000 Eyetracker as Experiment 1. Older subjects (4;6-5;6) completed a six point calibration routine, and younger subjects (3;6-4;6) completed a shorter three point calibration. The procedure was otherwise identical to Experiment 1, except that the experimenter offered frequent positive reinforcement at the end of each trial (e.g., “you’re doing great!”) that was not tied to the child’s behavior.

Analysis

We coded and analyzed children’s descriptions in the same way as Experiment 1, using a mixed effects model of the form $\text{Label} \sim \text{Scene Type} + (1|\text{Subject}) + (1 + \text{Scene Type}|\text{Item})$. However our eye movement analysis was importantly different from Experiment 1. We again focused on critical saccades between the target and foil pictures, as a proportion of all saccades between pictures. In our analysis, we compared Control trials (i.e., unambiguous scenes) to ambiguous scenes for which participants provided a non-specific description of the target (Uninformative trials), and to ambiguous scenes for which participants provided a referentially specific description (Informative trials). For each phase of the trial, we analyzed the proportion of critical saccades using a regression of the form $\text{Proportion of Critical Saccades} \sim \text{Label Type} + (1|\text{Subject})$. Note that we did not include Label Type as a random slope, as the analyses for some phases did not converge when it was included, and we wanted to be able to properly compare the analyses of each

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phase. The Label Type factor was dummy coded, with the unambiguous control condition set as the reference level.

Results

Descriptions

Children were reliably more likely to produce informative descriptions of ambiguous scenes than of unambiguous scenes but, as expected, they were not nearly as successful at this task as the adults were in Experiment 1 ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.2 (0.29)$, $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.06 (0.12)$ ($\beta = -1.2(0.18)$, $z = 6.3$, $p < .001$). There was significant individual variation in children's performance: 35 out of the 69 children did not produce any informative descriptions.³

Eye movements

³ When our mixed effects analysis included a random slope for condition, the effect of scene was only marginal ($\beta = -0.63(0.34)$, $z = 1.8$, $p = 0.068$) because of high variance in the random slope. This could reflect the large individual variability in children's performance, but it could also be due to difficulties estimating the best fitting model: Many participants showed no variation across the different regression factors (a situation called separation) which impedes fitting these models using maximum likelihood. An additional analysis using a paired sample t-test did also find a reliable effect of trial ambiguity ($t(68) = 4.69$, $p = 1.3e-05$).




Figure 3. Mean proportion of critical saccades in Experiment 2, across time windows.

Bars indicate +/- 1 standard error.

Preview Phase

Children's eye movements are graphed in Figure 3. The Preview phase provided evidence that children's frequent failure to provide referentially informative descriptions may be driven by a failure to proactively monitor for potential ambiguity. In particular, we found that participants provided no evidence for proactive monitoring before they produced uninformative descriptions. In fact, participants were slightly *less* likely to make critical saccades on trials where they produced an uninformative description of an

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ambiguous scene than on control trials ($\text{Mean}_{\text{uninformative}} = 0.3$ (0.13), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.33$ (0.12), $\text{Beta} = -0.1$ (0.066), $t = 1.5$, $p = 0.13$). By contrast, we found evidence that participants were engaging in proactive monitoring in the preview phase before they produced informative descriptions for ambiguous scenes: they made significantly more critical saccades on these trials ($\text{Mean}_{\text{informative}} = 0.39$ (0.15) ($\text{Beta} = 0.24$ (0.11), $t = 2.2$, $p = 0.028$)).

Consistent with these conclusions, a follow-up analysis demonstrated that children were more likely to produce informative descriptions on ambiguous trials, if they had previously made more critical saccades ($\text{Beta} = 0.45$ (0.17), $z = 2.7$, $p = 0.0073$).

Pre-Naming Phase

We found a similar pattern during the Pre-Naming Phase. Again, there was no evidence that children realized the scene was potentially ambiguous before they produced uninformative descriptions ($\text{Mean}_{\text{uninformative}} = 0.44$ (0.24), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.5$ (0.27) ($\text{Beta} = -0.099$ (0.075), $t = 1.3$, $p = 0.19$) However, children did make more critical saccades before producing informative descriptions ($\text{Mean}_{\text{uninformative}} = 0.57$ (0.32) ($\text{Beta} = 0.24$ (0.12), $t = 2$, $p = 0.046$)). This is to be expected if children need to compare the two images in order to identify which feature they should comment on to distinguish the two, while the small size of this effect is consistent with Experiment 1.

Post-Naming Phase

Finally, we looked to see whether children noticed the ambiguity once they had started producing the description. We found good evidence that children self-monitor. They were

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much more likely to make critical saccades when the scene was ambiguous, no matter whether their utterance was uninformative ($\text{Mean}_{\text{uninformative}} = 0.61 (0.22)$, $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.49 (0.25)$ ($\text{Beta} = 0.27(0.075)$, $t = 3.6$, $p < .001$) or informative ($\text{Mean}_{\text{informative}} = 0.64 (0.28)$ ($\text{Beta} = 0.29(0.12)$, $t = 2.4$, $p = 0.016$)). That is to say, even the children who produced uninformative descriptions appeared to subsequently notice the ambiguity of their expressions.

Discussion

Experiment 2 was designed to assess whether children engage in pro-active monitoring for potential ambiguity in the environment, as well as self-monitoring of their just-made utterances. Our results suggested that, typically, children do not engage in pro-active monitoring: Unlike adults, they rarely produced informative utterances, and their eye movements typically did not provide any indication that they had noticed any ambiguity. However, for those trials in which children did produce informative descriptions of ambiguous scenes, their eye movements indicated that they had engaged in proactive monitoring before they began speaking, and indeed before they knew which picture they had to describe. That is to say, children do not typically monitor the world for potential ambiguity, and the absence of such monitoring plays an important role in children's failure to succeed on referential communication tasks. However, when children do successfully engage in monitoring, there do not appear to be many other impediments to their producing an informative description. In sum, preschoolers have the competence to engage in pro-active monitoring -- and thus to produce informative descriptions -- but they typically fail to use it.

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Children also appeared to monitor their own utterances. When the visual scene was ambiguous, they tended to saccade to the matched foil after generating a description, which suggests that -- at some level -- the ambiguity of the scene relative to the description had been recognized. This behavior did not seem to vary based on whether the child's description was informative or not. However this finding raises a question: If children are monitoring what they say, then why did they rarely offer corrections or repairs to their utterances to make them more informative?

One possibility is that children did not correct because they were not truly motivated to, as each trial in Experiment 2 ended straight after they responded, and their utterance had no obvious adverse effects on an interlocutor. Consistent with this, adults were also unlikely to offer corrections after they produced uninformative descriptions in the linguistic ambiguity condition of Experiment 1. But another possibility is that these subsequent eye movements did not actually reflect potential error-correction, but rather just speech monitoring alone. For instance, it is possible that saying *dog* might simply have primed the speaker to look to the other dog. Experiment 3 therefore assessed whether children would be more likely to offer an informative description of a foil picture straight after describing a target picture, and whether this depended on having fixated the foil subsequent to describing the target. In this task, children named two pictures from a visual scene that was either ambiguous or not. If children rapidly adjust having made a mistake, then they should be relatively more informative when naming the second picture if the scene is ambiguous.

Experiment 3

Children in Experiment 3 were asked to name two out of three pictures from a scene. The task was similar to Experiment 2, except that, after having named the target picture (indicated as before by Elmo), children were asked to name the foil picture, which was indicated by the appearance of Peppa Pig. On half of the trials the target and foil depicted the same kind of thing, and on half of the trials they depicted different kinds of thing. If children use comprehension monitoring, as suggested by Experiment 2, then they should produce informative descriptions more often for foil pictures, but only when the scene is ambiguous.

We also examined whether children's eye movements predicted whether they would produce informative descriptions. We did this by first replicating Experiment 2's analysis of children's pro-active monitoring before the target picture was identified, and also by assessing whether children whose eye-movements provided better evidence of self-monitoring were also more likely to produce informative descriptions of the foil.

Methods

Participants

41 4- to 5-year-old children from the Edinburgh area (23 female, from 48 to 72 months, mean age 56 months [SD 6 months]). We did not record detailed demographic information, but we estimate that most children were White, from middle-class families. Children were tested in the Developmental Lab at the University of Edinburgh.

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Materials

Each participant completed 16 test trials (8 ambiguous scenes, 8 unambiguous) using the same pictures as Experiment 2, with no filler trials. On ambiguous trials, children saw a triad of pictures, two of which depicted the same type of object. On unambiguous trials, all three pictures depicted different objects. Unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, we created unambiguous trials by shuffling foil pictures between triads (e.g., so that a foil *shoe* picture might be swapped with a foil *car* picture). This, in combination with a Latin square design, meant that across conditions, all pictures appeared in both ambiguous and unambiguous trials, as well as in both target and foil positions, but that each child saw each picture only once in their experimental session.⁴ As such, we had a baseline measure of children's tendency to be informative for each picture, and for each position

Pictures were arranged in a T shape on a 1920 by 1080 resolution laptop monitor. Pictures were displayed such that they took up equivalent, non-overlapping areas of the screen, which meant that they had larger dimensions than in Experiment 2. Average height was 470 pixels and average width was 532 pixels.

Procedure

The experiment was conducted using an SMI Red-n remote eye tracker attached to a laptop computer. All subjects completed a four point calibration routine. Each trial began with a Preview phase, in which three pictures were displayed for 4250ms. Then, Elmo

⁴ An anonymous reviewer notes that this design may have increased the rate of utterances containing a modifier on unambiguous trials, if it is the case that children tend to add modifiers on the second occasion they use a label. Such an effect would work against our hypotheses.

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appeared next to the Target picture and a pre-recorded instruction asked participants "Which picture does Elmo like?" After participants answered, the experimenter pushed a button to begin the next phase of the trial: After a 500ms pause, Peppa Pig appeared next to the Foil picture and a pre-recorded instruction asked participants "And which picture does Peppa like?" Once the child answered, the experimenter ended the trial by pressing a key, and a reward screen appeared on which participants received positive feedback from Elmo and Peppa. Before the study, children received the same warm-up session as in Experiment 2.

Analysis

We coded and analyzed children's descriptions in a similar way to Experiments 1 and 2, using a mixed effects logistic regression of the form $\text{Label} \sim \text{Scene Type} * \text{Picture Type} [\text{Target versus Foil}] + (1 + \text{Scene Type} | \text{Subject}) + (1 + \text{Scene Type} | \text{Item})$.

For the eye movement analyses, we again split the trial into different phases, and defined ROIs around the border of each picture (ROIs varied based on picture size), analyzing eye movements between ROIs. Our first analysis aimed to replicate the finding that children are more likely to produce an informative description of the Target picture if they have monitored for ambiguity during the preview phase, again using a mixed effects model of the form $\text{Proportion of Critical Saccades} \sim \text{Label Type} + (1 | \text{Subject})$, as in Experiment 2.

Our second set of analyses tested what happened after children named the Target, in what we call the Pre-Foil Phase, the 1500ms window before participants were told to name the Foil (i.e., the final 1000ms during which Elmo was on screen, plus the 500ms

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pause before Peppa appeared on screen). First, we aimed to replicate the “self-monitoring” finding of Experiment 2, that when the scene is ambiguous, children saccade to the Foil after naming the Target, whether their description was informative or not. We again assessed this with the regression, Proportion of Critical Saccades \sim Label Type + (1|Subject). Next, we assessed whether children who show stronger evidence of self-monitoring were also more likely to produce an informative description of the Foil picture. For this analysis, we did not use the proportion of critical saccades as our dependent variable. Inspecting the data, we found that participants typically only made a single saccade during the Pre-Foil Phase; since that saccade tended to be a critical saccade on ambiguous trials, we had very little power to detect any effects using this measure. Instead, our measure of self-monitoring was the length of time (in ms) that participants spent fixating the foil picture during the Pre-Foil phase. Our rationale was that participants who are engaging in self-monitoring to a greater degree should notice the ambiguity earlier, and therefore spend more time fixating the foil after naming the Target. We tested whether participants who spent more time fixating the foil in this period were more likely to produce an informative description of the foil, and whether the size of this effect depended on the scene type (ambiguous/unambiguous). We did this using a logistic regression of the form Foil Label \sim Fixation time to foil * Scene Type + (1+ Scene Type|Subject).

Results

Descriptions

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Children produced more referentially specific descriptions of the Target picture when the scene was ambiguous than when it was unambiguous ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.37$ (0.43), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.23$ (0.35), and they produced an even greater number of specific descriptions of the Foil picture when the scene was ambiguous ($\text{Mean}_{\text{ambiguous}} = 0.41$ (0.43), $\text{Mean}_{\text{control}} = 0.22$ (0.33). Our regression analysis showed that participants were reliably more likely to produce specific descriptions when the trial was ambiguous ($\beta = -1.4$ (0.43), $z = 3.2$, $p = 0.0014$). We had predicted that this effect of scene type would interact with whether participants were naming the target picture or the foil; this interaction was only marginally significant, although in the predicted direction ($\beta = 0.22$ (0.12), $z = 1.9$, $p = 0.062$).⁵ When the scene was ambiguous, participants were reliably more likely to produce specific descriptions of the foil picture than the target picture ($\beta = -0.32$ (0.16), $z = 2$, $p = 0.046$), but this was not the case when the scene was unambiguous ($\beta = 0.11$ (0.17), $z = 0.68$, $p = 0.5$). In sum, we found some evidence that participants were engaging in production monitoring, although the effect was clearly not large.

Eye movements

⁵ To double check this result, we also analyzed the data using a within subjects ANOVA, and found that the interaction was significant $F(1,40) = 5.06$, $p = 0.03$.




Figure 4. Mean proportion of critical saccades in Experiment 3, across time windows. Bars indicate +/- 1 standard error.

Preview Phase

We first tried to replicate the finding that children show no evidence of pro-active monitoring on those trials where they subsequently produced uninformative descriptions of the target, but do show evidence of monitoring before they produce informative descriptions. This effect did indeed replicate (Figure 4). Participants made roughly similar numbers of critical saccades on control trials and on those ambiguous trials where they subsequently produced uninformative descriptions ($\text{Mean}_{\text{uninformative}} = 0.31 (0.14)$,

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Mean_{control} = 0.3 (0.09) (Beta = 0.13(0.093), $t = 1.4$, $p = 0.16$). Meanwhile, participants made reliably more critical saccades before they produced informative descriptions for ambiguous scenes (Mean_{informative} = 0.45 (0.26) (Beta = 0.25(0.11), $t = 2.3$, $p = 0.021$).

We also replicated the finding that participants were more likely to produce informative descriptions on trials where they produced more critical saccades (Beta = 0.33(0.15), $z = 2.3$, $p = 0.022$).

Pre-Foil Gaze

First, we replicated the self-monitoring analysis of Experiment 2 (Figure 4). Compared to the control condition (Mean_{control} = 0.38 (0.31), participants were reliably more likely to make critical saccades after describing an ambiguous Target with an uninformative description (Mean_{uninformative} = 0.6 (0.3, (Beta = 0.34(0.14), $t = 2.4$, $p = 0.016$)) and were marginally more likely to do so if they had produced an informative description (Mean_{informative} = 0.6 (0.35, (Beta = 0.29(0.17), $t = 1.7$, $p = 0.089$)).

Next, we tested whether children who seemed to be engaging in more production monitoring (i.e., who spent more time gazing at the Foil after naming the Target) were also more likely to produce informative descriptions of the Foil. Children were indeed more likely to provide informative descriptions of the Foil picture if they had spent more time fixating it in the 1500ms before it was indicated ($\beta = 0.36(0.18)$, $z = 2.1$, $p = 0.04$). They also spent more time fixating the Foil when the scene was ambiguous, consistent with the proposal that they were engaging in self-monitoring ($\beta = -1.1(0.36)$, $z = 3$, $p = 0.0027$). However, we found no interaction between Foil fixation time and scene type (β

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= 0.26(0.17), $z = 1.5$, $p = 0.14$), that is to say, participants who fixated the Foil longer also tended to provide more informative descriptions of that picture, no matter whether the scene was ambiguous or unambiguous.

Discussion

Children's eye movements in Experiment 2 had suggested that they were engaging in production based monitoring, checking how their just-produced utterance matched to the world. Experiment 3 tested whether this was indeed the case, or whether that finding might be better explained as priming. In fact, our evidence suggests that both possibilities may be correct. Following the predictions of production-based monitoring, children were more likely to produce specific descriptions for foil pictures than for target pictures, if the scene was ambiguous. However, this effect was not strong. In addition, we found that children were more likely to provide specific descriptions for foil pictures if they had gazed longer at them before describing them. However, this effect did not vary based on whether the scene was ambiguous or not, and so it does not provide clear support for the idea that children were using self-monitoring to correct their subsequent utterances. In sum, Experiment 3's production and eye tracking data do suggest that children self-monitor, but only provide limited support for the claim that children robustly use this self-monitoring to ensure that they immediately start to produce more informative utterances. At best, the data suggest that children can use this self-monitoring to correct their utterances, but they do not typically do so.

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In addition, Experiment 3 confirmed the other major finding of Experiment 2, that children are more likely to have explicitly monitored for ambiguity before they produce informative descriptions.

General Discussion

How, precisely, do adults ensure that they produce informative utterances, and how do these abilities develop in children? Here, we used eye tracking to confirm that, before speaking, adults proactively monitor the world for non-linguistic (but not linguistic) ambiguity, and subsequently self-monitor whether what they have said describes the world in an informative way. We also show that young children, by contrast, are limited in both of these skills. They frequently fail to take heed of any ambiguity in the world around them and, while they are able to monitor their own productions, they frequently do not use that information in the service of producing more informative utterances.

Our evidence for this is comparatively simple. Using an eye-tracked version of a referential communication task modeled on Ferreira et al (2005), we found that adults would saccade between a target and a foil picture in an array, if they were non-linguistically related (e.g., two different cars), even before they knew which of the pictures in the array they would need to describe. This suggests that adults noticed the potential for ambiguity as soon as they saw the scene. By contrast, we found little evidence for these eye movements when the target and foil picture were linguistically related (e.g., a baseball bat and an animal bat). We also found that adults would saccade to the foil picture once they had named the target, irrespective of whether the ambiguity was non-

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linguistic or linguistic, which suggests that adults monitor what they say and match it to the world.

Both of these processes -- proactive monitoring and self-monitoring -- seemed to be more error-prone in children. Children tended to offer uninformative descriptions when arrays were ambiguous, and on those uninformative trials their eye-movements provided no evidence that they had noticed a relationship between the target and foil pictures. It was only when the children did provide informative descriptions that they also showed good evidence of pro-active monitoring. This suggests that children are able to proactively monitor, but often fail to do so online. In addition, children showed evidence of self-monitoring. Like adults, they tended to saccade to the foil picture having described the target, which suggests that they monitor what they say for potential ambiguity. However, their subsequent utterances indicated that they only had a limited ability to incorporate this feedback. These data point toward a more mechanistic account of how children learn to successfully and informatively communicate.

How do adults pro-actively monitor, and how do children learn this skill?

Experiments 1 and 1a followed Ferreira et al (2005) in demonstrating that, before adults produce referring expressions, they automatically monitor the world around them (as well as, presumably, common ground) for non-linguistic ambiguity (such as the presence of two different dogs) but do not monitor the world for linguistic ambiguity (such as the presence of both baseball and animal bats). However, these monitoring processes are

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specific to speaking: adults did not monitor for any type of ambiguity when they only needed to communicate para-linguistically (i.e., through pointing). Pro-active monitoring therefore has two important characteristics that will impact on how children learn to do it. First, proactive monitoring appears to be specifically engaged when *describing* the world, rather than being a constant characteristic of how we perceive and represent the world around us. Second, the world is only monitored at certain levels of representation, e.g., it is not monitored at a level of representation that would allow adults to notice linguistic ambiguity. This latter point is particularly important, because there are multiple levels of representation that could potentially be monitored. For instance, speakers might monitor the world for conceptual overlap (e.g., two different dogs are tokens of the same type), for overlap based on simple similarity (different dogs share many properties), or perhaps for overlap at the level of lexical entries (Rabagliati & Snedeker, 2013).

What might be the learning mechanism through which children master pro-active monitoring? Previous work has suggested that the development of referential communication skills is importantly linked to the development of executive function skills (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Nilsen et al., 2013, 2015). For example, an increase in inhibitory or planning skills might boost children's ability to reliably engage in pro-active monitoring for ambiguity. In both Experiments 2 and 3, we found that children's tendency to produce informative utterances was dependent on whether they had engaged in pro-active monitoring; something that they did not always do. If pro-active monitoring is under executive control, then improvements to these executive skills might lead children to consistently, rather than infrequently, engage in monitoring.

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However executive functions cannot be the entire story, as these skills alone cannot tell children what information should be pro-actively monitored, i.e., that they must learn to monitor for non-linguistic ambiguity, but do not need to monitor for linguistic ambiguity. To determine which of these different levels of representation should be monitored, children need some signal to guide their learning: a so-called error signal that will indicate when they have successfully avoided ambiguity or not. Some work has suggested that this signal might be provided by caregivers and community members (Matthews, Butcher, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2012; Matthews et al., 2007). For instance, if the caregiver signals that the child's utterance is ambiguous, either explicitly through corrections or questions, or implicitly through some other behavior (e.g., if the parent retrieves something other than the child's desired referent), then the child can learn from their mistake, and adjust their language production algorithm.

Caregiver feedback is likely to be important, but the current experiments suggest an additional mechanism by which children could learn, one that is self- rather than other-guided. In particular, if -- as indicated by Experiments 2 and 3 -- children are monitoring what they say, then they might be able to derive an error signal by simply matching their utterance to the world, and noting whether it provides an informative description. Independent evidence suggests that pre-school children are able to judge whether other people's utterances are uninformative (Beal, 1987; Morisseau, Davies, & Matthews, 2013; Nilsen & Graham, 2012; Nilsen, Graham, Smith, & Chambers, 2008; Plumert, 1996). For example, using eye tracking, Nilsen et al (2008) found that preschoolers possessed tacit knowledge of whether an interlocutor's utterance was informative or ambiguous.

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Importantly, this effect was present even when the preschooler had private knowledge, allowing them themselves to interpret the utterance. If preschoolers can override their private knowledge, and implicitly realise when a speaker's statement may be ambiguous for a third party, then it is plausible that they will also be able to implicitly notice when their own utterances are ambiguous.

A child's implicit realization that their previous utterance was ambiguous could therefore serve as an error signal, i.e., as an indication that when the child's language production system is next used, it needs to operate slightly differently. As such, the error signal will encourage the developing system to explore the space of possible production routines. And indeed, Experiment 3 indicated that children were a small amount more likely to produce an informative utterance immediately subsequent to producing an uninformative utterance⁶, which suggests that children are both generating an error signal, and sometimes attending to it as well. An error signal that is based on matching the child's utterance with the word, could therefore be used to guide the development of the child's production system. In particular, it would help the system to explore how common ground representations should be monitored for potential ambiguity; a better monitoring system would be less likely to generate an error signal.

Still, if children are generating an error signal when they produce uninformative descriptions, then a somewhat surprising finding from Experiment 3 was that they do a

⁶ That said, in exploratory analyses of our data, we did not find evidence that children got better at this task as they completed more trials, which might be expected under this account. Perhaps this is because participants primed themselves to use single-word descriptions.

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quite limited job of subsequently using that error signal to avoid further ambiguity. As mentioned, the effect of self-monitoring on children's subsequent production was unexpectedly small in that experiment. Why might this be? First, we should note that, just because an error signal is generated, this does not mean that it must be immediately used for multiple different purposes. It is possible that children may not use the error signal to immediately correct their utterances, but may still use it to marginally optimize their language production architecture for the future. In addition, children's failure to immediately use self-monitoring to improve their descriptions of the foil in Experiment 3, is somewhat matched by adult behavior. Looking back at the data from Ferreira et al (2005), one can see that there was only a surprisingly small effect of self-monitoring on adults' tendency to avoid further ambiguity: when naming, e.g., a baseball bat after an animal bat, adults still produced less-informative descriptions (e.g., calling the baseball bat a bat) for the second-named item on over 35% of trials. This behavior is similar in kind, though not degree, to the behavior of the children in the present study. Thus, given that adults are themselves limited at using self-monitoring to generate more informative utterances, it seems less surprising that children also struggle to do this.

The fact that self-monitoring appears to only have a limited effect on how children produce referring expressions, suggests that it cannot be the only learning mechanism behind the development of referential communication. Indeed, previous work has shown that communicative skills can be quite quickly improved through caregiver feedback (Matthews et al, 2007). It may well be that these two mechanisms complement each other;

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the signal from caregiver feedback may be available more rarely than the signal from self-monitoring, but may also have a greater impact on behavior.

The data here, and prior work on ambiguity avoidance in adults, suggest a plausible, mechanistic account of how children master at least some key aspects of the language production mechanisms necessary for avoiding ambiguity during referential communication. Under this account, one potential mechanism for ambiguity avoidance – self-monitoring – is operative from the start, but is not itself particularly efficacious for avoiding ambiguity, as discussed. However, self-monitoring also plays a role as a learning mechanism. In combination with other mechanisms such as caregiver feedback, it helps children to develop a much more effective form of ambiguity avoidance: pro-active monitoring. This account builds upon earlier work in the field, such as the “hierarchy of skills” approach (Sonnenschein & Whitehurst, 1984), in that it also assumes multiple different skills are involved in the process of referential development. However, it is focused on multiple different moment-by-moment language production processes, rather than broader heuristics about how communication should proceed. In addition, the account can potentially explain some of the ways in which improved executive function may result in improved referential communication (Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Nilsen et al., 2013, 2015). For instance, improved executive function could cause children to be mindful to scan for potential ambiguity in the environment before speaking. However, we note that under this account, the development of referential communication is not simply the result of domain general improvements to executive function, but involves the creation of

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domain-specific language production procedures (e.g., for encoding and monitoring common ground).

The idea that children might learn to do pro-active monitoring through self-monitoring can be tested in multiple different ways. For example, longitudinal studies could assess the relationship between how children monitor their own productions and subsequent changes in how they pro-actively monitor for ambiguity before speaking. Work could also examine whether children can learn to monitor for different types of ambiguity: since we have argued that children *learn* to monitor for non-linguistic ambiguity, we predict that they will also be able to learn to monitor for linguistic ambiguities.

We end by noting some of the limitations of this study. First, our referential communication task was stripped down: while participants described pictures to the experimenter, they never received anything other than positive feedback on their utterances, and never had to interpret other people's utterances. While these characteristics do not impact on our major conclusions, it could be that children might have shown better performance in a more ecologically rich task (although note that Ferreira et al. 2005 found that adults were just as likely to produce informative descriptions without a partner, suggesting that adult-like informative communication is somewhat automatized). Second, our visual scenes were perhaps more visually complex than those used in many tasks: non-linguistic ambiguities were created by pairing quite different instances of each kind (see Figure 1), while previous work has often used target-foil pairs that differ on only one or perhaps two dimensions (e.g., small and large versions of the same shape). Although greater ecological validity may seem an advantage, it could be the case that if we had used more

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constrained conditions then children may have been better able to monitor for and describe ambiguity, which might perhaps have provided more statistical power.

But even with these limitations, our studies suggest a number of concrete conclusions concerning children's and adult's referential communication. They conclusively show how adults pro-actively monitor for non-linguistic, but not linguistic, ambiguity. They demonstrate how children rarely perform this type of monitoring, yet also show that, when they do, they tend to produce informative utterances. And they show that children re-interpret their own utterances and match them against the world, providing suggestive evidence for a self-guided learning mechanism. Further work is necessary to test whether this self-guided mechanism does indeed help children master the skills behind informative communication.

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